The strength of the United States military has always rested not just on cutting-edge technology and highly trained personnel, but on a robust system that keeps every jet, ship, and vehicle mission ready.
Yet, a new government watchdog report reveals that the U.S. Navy is facing an alarming reality: to keep essential weapon systems running, maintainers have had to cannibalize grounded equipment for spare parts.
This problem, born from a tangle of vendor-controlled data rights and government red tape, is not just an issue of supply but a matter of national security and military readiness.
The report, released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), shines a light on a critical issue that has been festering beneath the surface of the Department of Defense.
Because the DOD lacks the necessary data rights and intellectual property from contractors, Navy maintainers are frequently forced to rely on vendors for replacement parts.
As a result, delays in repairs can stretch on for months, pushing our sailors and airmen into a position where they must repurpose parts from other grounded aircraft and submarines just to meet operational requirements.
The roots of this problem stretch back to the way contracts are written and the types of data the DOD secures when acquiring new weapon systems.
Statutes allow the DOD to access operational, maintenance, installation, and training data, but they stop short of granting rights to detailed manufacturing information.
Therefore, when a crucial component fails, only the original vendor can supply the part, often on their own timeline and at their price. This leaves the military at the mercy of contractors, who are not always incentivized to act quickly.
The GAO found that across several high-profile programs—including the F/A-18 and F-35 fighter aircraft, the Littoral Combat Ship, the Stryker Combat Vehicle, and the Virginia-class submarine—Navy and DOD personnel lacked the essential data rights to perform depot-level sustainment.
This kind of maintenance is highly specialized, and the inability to perform it without vendor involvement means the military faces vendor lock, with the government paying more for longer waits.
For example, maintainers working on the F/A-18 shared with the GAO that, after years of unsuccessfully attempting to secure the data rights for frequency cables, they were “cannibalizing grounded aircraft for the part.”
The only available replacement came from the original vendor, who controls the production and distribution timeline.
This workaround might keep some jets in the air, but it comes at a significant price. According to the report, “ripping parts from grounded aircraft to plug holes in others can lead to an uptick in maintenance costs, workload, and aircraft availability.”
The story was similar for those responsible for the Virginia-class submarine. Maintainers were again forced to cannibalize parts from other submarines, all because of contractor ownership of technical data for key components.
This is not just a logistical headache; it directly undermines military readiness at a time when geopolitical tensions call for a robust and fully functional fleet.
The consequences of this system go beyond just spare parts.
When the DOD fails to obtain full data rights or mismanages the intellectual property it does receive, the result is miscommunication and misunderstanding about what the government can and cannot do to keep its systems operational.
The GAO report makes it clear that this disconnect hampers the military’s ability to plan for the long term, as DOD offices cannot always anticipate exactly which data rights they’ll need down the road.
Sometimes they ask for too little, creating problems later. Other times, if they overreach, contractors are scared off or costs balloon.
The GAO’s solution is clear: Congress should step in and clarify exactly how manufacturing data must be handled in contracts between the DOD and vendors.
The watchdog further recommends that the Pentagon provide additional intellectual property planning for systems already in sustainment and reexamine how they evaluate the delivery of technical data.
From a broader perspective, this is the kind of government mismanagement that true leaders seek to address. When America’s military is forced to borrow parts from one system just to keep another running, it is a sign that the bureaucracy has overtaken common sense.
What our servicemen and women need is not more red tape or more vendor control, but leaders willing to take decisive action—leaders who put American security and military superiority first.
In the current administration, there is a growing call for strong, principled leadership at the top of the Department of Defense, and voices like Secretary Pete Hegseth have signaled a shift toward accountability, innovation, and putting the warfighter first.
By embracing a results-driven approach, Washington can ensure that the Navy and all branches of the military are never again left scrambling for spare parts. Our readiness and our national security depend on it.